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The UN Committee Against Torture: 
Human Rights Monitoring and the Legal 
Recognition of Cruelty
Tobias Kelly*
AbSTRACT
Focusing on the Committee Against Torture, this article argues that human 
rights monitoring can hide as much as it reveals. In particular, monitoring 
should be understood as a “second order” process that displaces the discus-
sion of the causes and consequences of violence in favor of a focus on the 
systems that are supposed to monitor cruelty. In this process, measurements, 
monitoring, and prevention are in danger of becoming merged. As such, 
the ways in which the Committee Against Torture produces and assesses 
information serves simultaneously to create a depoliticized conception of 
violence and to reproduce political inequalities between states.
INTRodUCTIoN
Torture is perhaps the most widely prohibited of all human rights violations 
and has a significant place in virtually every major international human rights 
instrument. At the heart of the international prohibition of torture lies the 
UN Committee Against Torture (“the Committee”), which is charged with 
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monitoring compliance with the UN Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). The work 
of the Committee plays an important role in defining torture and ensuring 
that states comply with CAT. As with the other UN human rights commit-
tees, however, it lacks the means of enforcement. Instead, the Committee 
reviews reports from states, alongside information from NGOs and other 
international bodies, and then issues non-binding recommendations. As 
such, the Committee is best understood as a form of knowledge production. 
Based in tranquil Geneva, it sorts, prioritizes, and distinguishes between vast 
amounts of information. 
The recognition of torture presents unique challenges. Torture’s particu-
lar stigma, as one of the most universally recognized violations of human 
rights raises the stakes for those states accused of torture. Very few, if any, 
states willingly admit that they participate in torture. Furthermore, despite its 
apparent moral absolutism, torture remains a notoriously slippery category 
to define because its meaning constantly shifts under pressure. Finally, the 
overwhelming pain of torture, and the often subtle ways it is administered, can 
block forms of communication, which in turn creates doubt about torture’s 
very existence in any given case.1 Any attempt to recognize torture must 
therefore overcome serious political, legal, and epistemological hurdles. 
This article turns the ethnographic gaze on the human rights monitoring 
process, in order to determine the forms of knowledge that human rights 
monitoring produces about cruelty and suffering. Although monitoring lies at 
the heart of the UN human rights system, the specific nature of the monitoring 
process has often been taken for granted and its content seen as self-evident 
in the wider debates over enforceability and political reform. However, 
monitoring is not merely a technical process of information gathering, but 
is suffused with normative assumptions about forms of accountability and 
responsibility. Monitoring can be understood as having at least two main two 
goals. The first is to monitor compliance with a UN convention. The second 
is to promote the human rights contained in a given convention. As such, 
in the first place the practices and procedures of torture prevention have 
to be made “monitorable” and amenable to particular forms of assessment. 
Surfaces have to be created from which information can be read. Human 
rights indicators, in the shape of statistics, legislation, and codes of practice 
are much easier for the Committee to deal with than the often messy day-
to-day reality of prison guarding or interrogation techniques. 
Monitoring does not rely upon direct inspection, but instead relies on 
information one stage removed from the infliction of violence that is gathered 
by states, NGOs, and other parts of the United Nations, all of which has to 
  1. ElainE Scarry, ThE Body in Pain: ThE Making and UnMaking of ThE World (1986).
2009 UN Committee Against Torture 779
be evaluated by the Committee. It is therefore a second order process that 
does not simply reveal information, but abstracts and codifies it.2 In a second 
step, as part of the task of prevention, Committee members also judge the 
risks presented by particular institutional arrangements. This judgment is an 
assessment of whether those specific arrangements are more likely to lead 
to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, for example. Monitoring therefore 
does not simply use evidence that is “out there,” but filters it through judg-
ments about expertise, trust, and risk. However, in this process, discussion 
of the causes and consequences of violence is often displaced in favor of 
a discussion of the systems that are supposed to monitor cruelty.3 Human 
rights indicators become confused with human rights and there is a slippage 
between the process of monitoring and the practices designed to prevent 
human rights violations. 
The central argument of this article is that the merging of techniques 
of monitoring and visions of prevention reproduces a particular vision of 
the liberal nation-state. In doing so the Committee implicitly assumes that 
formally liberal institutions produce liberal practices throughout all levels of 
society and ignores the ways in which liberal politics can produce its own 
forms of violence. As a result, the monitoring process of the UN Committee 
Against Torture simultaneously creates depoliticized conceptions of violence 
and reproduces political inequalities between states. The Committee’s pro-
cess of monitoring compliance with the prohibition against torture therefore 
does not simply produce transparent forms of knowledge, but can hide as 
much as it reveals, as the everyday practices and structural inequalities that 
produce torture are downplayed in favor of a focus on formal processes and 
procedures.
The argument presented below is based on ethnographic fieldwork at 
the 2006 and 2007 sessions of the Committee Against Torture. During this 
period the United States, Qatar, the Republic of Georgia, Togo, Ukraine, 
Denmark, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, the Netherlands, Peru, and 
Poland presented reports. Throughout this time, I attended the sessions of 
the Committee as well as interviewed Committee members, staff of the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Secretariat, and 
numerous NGO and state representatives. This fieldwork is supplemented 
by an analysis of the numerous reports produced by the state parties to the 
Convention, NGOs, and the Committee itself.4 
  2. MichaEl PoWEr, ThE aUdiT SociETy: riTUalS of VErificaTion (1997).
  3. Id. 
  4. Where not directly cited, quotations and comments in this article from Committee 
members, NGO representatives, UN civil servants and representatives of state parties 
come from interviews I conducted during this fieldwork, the notes of which are on file 
with the author.
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II. ToRTURE, RECoGNITIoN, ANd HUMAN RIGHTS
Despite the moral absolutism against torture, the concept itself remains 
notoriously vague. At the heart of the prohibition of torture lies a moral 
objection to suffering and pain. Yet, in medical terms there is no specific 
syndrome associated with torture victims. Rather, symptoms of torture vic-
tims can range from severe psychosis to mild nightmares.5 The most widely 
accepted medical condition associated with torture victims, Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), also affects a much wider group of people than those 
who have been subjected to torture.6 Furthermore, a diagnosis of PTSD 
does not capture the whole experience of torture survivors, who are often 
as concerned with access to housing, welfare, and employment as they are 
about medical treatment.7 
One famous argument claims that the distinctive nature of torture lies in 
its ability to destroy the capacity to communicate.8 However, the idea that 
the pain of torture is a fundamentally private experience denies the ways in 
which pain is itself a social relationship. As Veena Das argues, the statement 
“I am in pain” is a declarative statement that does not describe a state, but 
voices a complaint.9 The task for academics, human rights activists and clini-
cians is therefore to create the conditions that allow the “private experiences 
of pain to move out into the realm of publicly articulated experiences of 
pain . . . to create a moral community through the sharing of pain.”10 The 
problem of torture is therefore not one of the failure of language, but the 
failure of recognition. The issue is not that victims are unable to communi-
cate their suffering, but that lawyers, doctors, and other practitioners find it 
difficult to recognize when and where torture has taken place. The ways in 
which legal processes produce or deny claims about torture is therefore a 
question of great importance. 
An understanding of the concept of torture cannot be separated from 
the legal practices that have shaped its meanings and implications. Torture 
should be seen as a legal category, referring to specific forms of cruelty and 
suffering. More specifically, the category of torture is rooted in European 
legal reform of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.11 The growth of 
  5. See James Jaranson, The Science and Politics of Rehabilitating Torture Survivors: An 
Overview, in caring for VicTiMS of TorTUrE 15 (James Jaranson & Michael Popkin eds., 
1998). 
  6. Derek Summerfield, A Critique of Seven Assumptions Behind Psychological Trauma 
Programmes in War Affected Areas, 48 Soc. Sci. & MEd. 1449 (1999).
  7. dUncan forrEST & françoiSE hUTTon, gUidElinES for ThE ExaMinaTion of SUrViVorS of TorTUrE 
(2000).
  8. Scarry, supra note 1.
  9. VEEna daS, criTical EVEnTS: an anThroPological PErSPEcTiVE on conTEMPorary india (1995).
 10. Id. at 193.
 11. John h. langBEin, TorTUrE and ThE laW of Proof: EUroPE and England in ThE anciEn régiME 
(1977); EdWard PETErS, TorTUrE (2d ed. 1996).
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judicial torture in medieval Europe was not simply the product of arbitrary 
and capricious politics, but rather a desire to create legally reliable evidence. 
Similarly, the abolition of torture took place following the creation of forms 
of punishment, such as prisons, that unlike the death penalty did not seem 
to demand absolute levels of proof. The concept of torture has therefore 
developed not as a direct expression of human experience, but against the 
background of judicial reforms. 
This connection between torture and legal reform does not mean that 
wider moral and sentimental definitions of torture are commonplace. Indeed 
the term torture is often applied to a range of activities that far exceed its 
narrow legal definition. It also does not mean that the legal concept of 
torture is unified or coherent. There are important and ongoing conflicts 
over the threshold of the severity of pain and cruelty, the role of intention, 
the identity of perpetrators, and the positive obligations of states to prevent 
torture. However, juridical institutions and legal forums remain the central 
place where the precise meanings of torture are debated and recognized. 
It is therefore necessary to explore how the production of legal knowledge 
about torture prioritizes particular forms of knowledge about cruelty and 
suffering over others. As part of this exploration we need to scrutinize the 
ways in which legal practices shape and produce, rather than simply distort 
understandings of suffering.12 The task therefore is not to examine how the 
legal processes of recognizing torture sanitize subjective experiences, but 
rather to explore how the legal recognition of torture produces multi-layered, 
and often contradictory, forms of knowledge about suffering.
Human rights practices play a central role in the recognition of cruelty 
and suffering. However, UN human rights committees hold an ambiguous 
position in international law. Although they are at the center of the interna-
tional human rights system, they lack the ability to determine issues of fact, 
or to issue legally binding decisions. Their uncertain status is often termed 
“quasi-legal” or “quasi-judicial.” This ambiguity is central to the forms of 
knowledge produced by the human rights monitoring system. The Committee 
Against Torture members, for example, operate in a grey area between fact 
and law because they are never entirely certain of the empirical ground upon 
which they stand, nor are they able or willing to make clear determinations 
on matters of legal doctrine. Furthermore, although the Committee members 
are supposed to monitor compliance, they do not have the resources to 
launch effective investigations. 
In the face of this normative and empirical uncertainty, the Committee 
members regain a measure of stability through a general distinction between 
what are seen as culturally and institutionally developed and underdeveloped 
 12. Compare Kirsten Hastrup, Violence, Suffering and Human Rights: Anthropological 
Reflections, 3 anThroPoligical ThEory 309 (2003).
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states. The relative absence of torture is linked to “liberal” political institutions 
and values. States that fail to meet this idealized model, which in reality ex-
ists nowhere, are treated as pathological failures.13 From the penal reformers 
of the eighteenth century, to the debates over the “war on terror,” the fight 
against torture has been associated with the values of a seemingly enlightened 
modernity.14 The eradication of torture was a central part of the civilizing mis-
sion of the nineteenth and twentieth century.15 More recently, the seeming 
tension between the use of torture and the purported “values of the civilized 
world” has been at the heart of debates over the meanings and implications 
of the war on terror.16 In practice, the historical opposition between torture 
and states that claim to uphold the values of civilization is not self-evident.17 
However, at the levels of professed values and legal discourse within those 
nations at least, torture directly contradicts liberal modernity. 
Given international law’s links to the values of “modernity” and “civi-
lization,” it is perhaps unsurprising that recent work has also highlighted 
the ways in which international human rights law can reproduce global 
inequalities.18 Such arguments have illuminated how colonial categories are 
re-inscribed into the practice of international law. Although these critiques 
are important, they are often based on the analysis of text or broad histories 
of international relations and diplomacy. As a result, they ignore the contra-
dictory intentions and desires of the individuals and organizations through 
which human rights law is reproduced. For the UN Committee Against Tor-
ture, the reproduction of the divide between developed and underdeveloped 
nations is not a deliberate policy, but rather is a product of the political 
constraints faced by the Committee as well as its institutional weaknesses. 
The rest of this article, therefore, explores the ways in which international 
human rights law is produced in the context of cross cutting intentions and 
institutions, as people grapple with the difficult task of monitoring human 
rights compliance.
III. THE UNITEd NATIoNS CoNVENTIoN AGAINST ToRTURE
CAT was adopted in 1984, and entered into force on 26 June 1987.19 The 
United Nations created the Convention after intense lobbying by NGOs, 
 13. Mark Duffield, Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a 
Relation of Global Liberal Governance, 33 dEV. & changE 1049 (2002).
 14. Stanford Levinson, Contemplating Torture: An Introduction to TorTUrE: a collEcTion 23 
(Stanford Levinson ed., 2004).
 15. anTony anghiE, iMPErialiSM, SoVErEignTy and ThE Making of inTErnaTional laW (2005).
 16. Levinson, supra note 14.
 17. dariUS rEJali, TorTUrE and dEMocracy (2007).
 18. anghiE, supra note 15.
 19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 
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most notably Amnesty International. As of April 2009, there are 146 state 
parties to CAT.20 In its preamble the treaty declares its aim is “to make more 
effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment throughout the world.” Article 1 defines torture 
as any act that causes mental or physical pain that is inflicted in order to 
obtain information, a confession, or to coerce and intimidate. Importantly, 
the Convention’s definition of torture in Article 1 does not include “pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
The prohibition of torture is absolute. It has no exceptions for security rea-
sons or otherwise, and Article 2 states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever . . . may be invoked as a justification of torture.” The central 
principle behind the Convention is the prevention of impunity by ensuring 
that torture is effectively criminalized by member states. 
The Committee was established by CAT in order to monitor compliance 
with the Convention.21 The Committee is made up of ten members, elected 
every four years by the states that have ratified the Convention. Members 
are nominated by their states, but once they sit on the Committee they are 
supposed to act independently. The practice has been to have two South 
American, two African, three European, one North American, one Eastern 
European, and one Chinese member. Of the ten members in 2008, two 
worked in NGOs, three were diplomats, three worked in law schools, and 
two as judges.
By establishing a monitoring committee CAT mirrors other UN human 
rights treaties. As Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi argue, signatory states 
were unable to agree on the precise powers of the UN human rights system 
from the outset, with the United States and USSR particularly keen to avoid 
any restrictions on sovereignty.22 This disagreement resulted in a monitoring 
process with a deliberately restricted mandate. As with the other committees, 
the terms of reference for the Committee Against Torture leave considerable 
room for interpretation and contestation between states and the Committee 
members. As such, it is crucial to recognize that the roles and processes of 
the Committee are constantly changing. The Committee is not a functional 
product of international governance, or a direct response to international 
human rights violations. Rather, the practices of the Committee are frag-
   51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force 26 June 1987), reprinted in 23 i.l.M. 
1027 (1984), substantive changes noted in 24 i.l.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter CAT].
 20. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&id=129&chapter=4&lang=en. 
 21. CAT, supra note 19, at arts. 17–18.
 22. rogEr norMand & Sarah Zaidi, hUMan righTS aT ThE Un: ThE PoliTical hiSTory of UniVErSal 
JUSTicE (2008).
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mented and conflicted because they are produced through the interaction 
of international diplomats, UN civil servants, and NGOs.23 
To comply with their obligations under the Convention, state parties 
must submit an initial report one year after ratifying the Convention and a 
periodic report every four years thereafter. The Convention merely requires 
states to “submit to the Committee . . . reports on the measures they have 
taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention.”24 It does 
not detail the format of the reports, their length, or the forms of information 
required. Historically, there has been a wide variation in the reports sent to 
the Committee. The Committee does issue guidelines for the presentations of 
reports, but these are not always followed. In the late 1990s, the Committee 
also adopted the practice of sending a list of issues, essentially a request for 
further information after the periodic report had been submitted, six months 
prior to examining a state’s report.25 Additionally, in 2007, the Committee 
adopted a new procedure to send out an initial set of issues upon which 
the reporting state is asked to base its periodic report.26 
As with the reporting process, the specific process through which reports 
are examined is not set out in the Convention. As of 2008, the Committee 
meets twice a year, once in May and once in November, for three and two 
weeks respectively. Reporting states have the opportunity to present their 
report, and then those states receive questions from the members. After 
questioning, the state has thirty-six hours to reply. After examination, the 
Convention enables the Committee to, “at its discretion, decide to include 
any comments.”27 CAT does not make these comments obligatory, nor does 
it set out their form. Over the years there has been much variation in what 
have come to be called “conclusions and recommendations.” The very term 
“recommendation” is a discretionary insertion from the Committee and is 
not included in the text of the Convention. Originally, the conclusions were 
issued by individual members, not by the Committee as a whole. More re-
cently the Committee has moved towards more systematic conclusions that 
include positive comments as well as subjects of concern. The Committee 
attaches distinct recommendations to each issue.28 
 23. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Move-
ments and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 harV. inT’l l. J. 529 (2000).
 24. CAT, supra note 19, at art. 19 ¶1.
 25. Committee Against Torture, Harmonized Guidelines on Reporting Under the International 
Human Rights Treaties, Including Guidelines on a Core Document and Treaty-Specific 
Documents, Extract of HRI/GEN/2/Rev.5, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cat/docs/HRI-CoreGuidelines-CAT.doc. 
 26. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), New 
Optional Reporting Procedure Adopted by the Committee Against Torture, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/reporting-procedure.htm. 
 27. CAT, supra note 19, at art. 19 ¶4.
 28. OHCHR, Committee Against Torture—Working Methods: Overview of the Working 
Methods of the Committee Against Torture, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cat/workingmethods.htm#a4. 
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Alongside the formal Committee sessions, CAT establishes three parallel 
mechanisms.29 The first is a system of complaints, known as communications, 
by private individuals about specific incidences of torture. States opt into 
this process and decisions are then communicated to the state and petitioner 
involved. The second is a “confidential inquiry” by one of the Committee 
members. Committee members have only employed this process in three 
cases (Brazil, Egypt, and Turkey). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an 
Optional Protocol to the Convention (OPCAT) entered into force on 22 June 
2006. OPCAT established a sub-committee in order to ensure a “system of 
regular visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies to 
places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”30 At the 
time of writing, the OPCAT process is in its initial stages and its direct rela-
tionship to the Committee is still largely undefined. The focus of this paper, 
then, is the state reporting process, as that remains the most comprehensive 
part of the monitoring process. 
The general consensus amongst commentators, NGOs, and even many 
diplomats and UN employees is that the Committee is weak. Common 
complaints include the claim that the Committee’s members do not have the 
necessary levels of expertise to grasp complicated legal issues, and that they 
do not understand the implications of their formal independence. Academic 
writings also routinely describe the monitoring process as being in crisis.31 
However, it is important to note that although states complain about the 
Committee’s ineffectiveness, the design of the Committee and its membership 
is decided by the states themselves. As such, the limitations of the Com-
mittee should not be seen simply as a failure, but rather as the product of 
a deliberately restricted mandate. Realist critiques of the UN human rights 
system are liable to dismiss human rights monitoring as an unenforceable 
irrelevance. Recent work, however, has suggested that the influence of the 
various UN human rights committees is diffuse and indirect because their 
conclusions, recommendations, and communications take on a life of their 
own.32 NGOs, courts, and even governments use the Committee’s recom-
 29. CAT, supra note 19, at arts. 20 ¶2, 22.
 30. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 18 Dec. 2002, G.A. Res. A/RES/57/199, 
U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., art.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (2003) (entered into force 22 
June 2006), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 26 (2003). 
 31. Roland Bank, Country-oriented Procedures Under the Convention Against Torture: 
Towards a New Dynamism, in ThE fUTUrE of Un hUMan righTS TrEaTy MoniToring 145 
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); James Crawford, The UN Human Rights 
Treaty System: A System in Crisis?, in ThE fUTUrE of Un hUMan righTS TrEaTy MoniToring, 
supra, at 1.
 32. Sally EnglE MErry, hUMan righTS and gEndEr ViolEncE (2006).
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mendations in their own political struggles. Despite the many weaknesses 
and criticisms of its work, it is therefore important to understand the logic 
and structure of the specific forms of knowledge produced by the UN Com-
mittee Against Torture. The rest of this section will therefore examine the 
sources of information with which the Committee works. 
A. State Reports
The principal source of information for the Committee is the reports produced 
by each signatory state. Reports are meant to describe new measures and 
developments that relate to the implementation of the Convention since the 
last report. States are supposed to report every four years,33 yet many of them 
do not do so, and several have not reported since ratifying the Convention. 
The Committee has no powers to force states to submit reports and accord-
ing to one estimate over 70 percent of states have overdue reports.34 For 
those states that do provide reports, they can refuse to answer the questions 
of the Committee, or answer in a way that obscures the situation on the 
ground.35 For example, states often fill their written reports with long lists 
of legislation and formal polices, rather than concrete practices. Faced with 
these vast amounts of information, the Committee has to decide how much 
of it is reliable and how much of it is mere window-dressing. 
However, the Committee has limited investigatory powers to supple-
ment the information they receive from states. The Committee’s financial 
and time resources are severely constrained. Members are unpaid and only 
work in Geneva for five weeks a year. The rest of the time they have other 
jobs. Although the Committee is supported by a secretariat drawn from 
the civil servants of the OHCHR, none of these civil servants works for the 
Committee full time. Some Committee members, especially those with NGO 
backgrounds, do carry out their own private visits, but do so out of their own 
funds and on their own time. The resources available to the Committee are 
far smaller than those available to any state so the Committee operates with 
an information deficit in relation to the states whose reports it examines.
b. NGos and the Committee
To a great extent, the Committee relies on information supplied by NGOs. As 
such, NGOs can play a central role in setting the Committee’s agenda, the 
 33. CAT, supra note 19, at art. 19 ¶1.
 34. annE BayEfSky, ThE Un hUMan righTS TrEaTy SySTEM: UniVErSaliTy aT ThE croSSroadS 7 
(2001).
 35. See MErry, hUMan righTS and gEndEr ViolEncE, supra note 32.
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questions they ask, and eventually the recommendations that they make. Of-
ficially NGOs are only supposed to contact the Committee members through 
the Secretariat, but in practice they often do so independently, especially if 
they have an ongoing relationship with an individual member. The involve-
ment of NGOs can begin up to a year prior to a state’s session, when they 
meet the Committee’s country rapporteurs and the OHCHR Secretariat in 
order to explain the key issues the Committee should address. Prior to the 
session, NGOs also normally submit written “shadow reports.” The Com-
mittee Against Torture has probably formalized the participation of NGOs 
to a greater extent than any other part of the UN human rights system. For 
example, the Committee sets aside formal closed briefing sessions, complete 
with translators.36 
Given the involvement of NGOs, the Committee often appears to be 
influenced by the information provided by NGOs. During state sessions mem-
bers sometimes refer directly to information from human rights organizations, 
especially if the organization has a high international profile. More often 
than not, however, members simply quote from the NGOs reports, without 
indicating the source. It is possible to trace the issues raised in shadow reports 
and in NGO briefings to those that arise in the formal sessions. The World 
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), for example, carried out a survey that 
found that in the reports in which it had engaged, between 18 percent and 
53 percent of the recommendations produced by the Committee could be 
traced back to recommendations originally made by OMCT.37 
Despite heavy NGO participation in general, there is often a disparity in 
the amount of information provided by NGOs on different states. Over fifteen 
NGOs submitted information for the US report, where as no organization 
did so for Qatar. Similarly, only one international NGO was present for the 
report from Togo. Smaller NGOs are also often confused by the rules of the 
Committee, which are slightly different from the other branches of the UN 
human rights treaty monitoring system and are also constantly changing as 
the Committee adjusts its procedures. The Committee also faces a particu-
lar problem in assessing the relative credibility of information produced by 
NGOs. The policy of accepting any submitted information creates a problem 
of whether to trust all of the information, and how much relative weight to 
give it. The Committee makes some attempt to check claims against press 
reports, national human rights ombudsmen, and information supplied by 
other UN organizations. To a large extent, however, the Committee members 
 36. OHCHR, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) to the Reporting Process to the Committee Against Torture, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/follow_up_ngo.htm. 
 37. organiSaTion MondialE conTrE la TorTUrE, raPPorT narraTif (2006) (on file with author).
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can only rely on the relative reputation of the organization that submitted 
the information. As a result, the Committee tends to rely on the information 
supplied by the larger international NGOs. 
Nearly all of the Committee members recognize that they could not do 
their work without the input of NGOs, and they depend on human rights 
organizations for their basic information.38 However, the extent to which 
they are open to NGO involvement varies from member to member, and is 
often linked to whether the respective member has an NGO background. 
One Committee member, for example, who works for a psychosocial orga-
nization, told me that she found the involvement of NGOs in the process 
as one of its most refreshing features. Another, who worked as a diplomat, 
said that he thinks NGOs take up too much time. Some states also complain 
that NGOs are too influential in the process, and that they have not come 
to Geneva to have a discussion with a domestic NGO. In sum, while NGOs 
play a central role in the Committee’s information gathering process, their 
position is contested by both states and Committee members.
C. Gaps in Knowledge and the Monitoring Process
The Committee’s information gathering about torture and compliance with 
CAT is marked by gaps, inconsistencies, and questions. Problems in the 
institutional capacity of the Committee, the lack of knowledge of its mem-
bers, and its technical procedures contribute to the Committee’s difficulty 
in assessing the information provided by any particular state as compared 
to the situation in reality. One particular problem is that there is a routine 
delay of two years between the report’s submission and its being heard. Yet, 
if all the states that are supposed to send reports did so the delay would be 
much longer. An additional problem is that two yearly meetings for a total 
of five weeks is simply not long enough to process the large amounts of pa-
perwork included in the reports. For example, for the US report, NGOs and 
the US delegation together submitted over 3,200 pages of documentation. 
This amount was abnormally high, but Committee members often complain 
that they do not have time to read all the documents for a particular ses-
sion. Additionally, translation of the documents poses a problem. For the 
US report, for example, one of the two rapporteurs only worked in French. 
Although the initial US report, written in English, was translated into French, 
the written replies were not. The result is that large parts of the replies are 
not available to the Committee members who do not share the language 
of the written report. 
 38. MErry, hUMan righTS and gEndEr ViolEncE, supra note 32, at 69.
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The gaps and limitations in the knowledge produced by the Commit-
tee mean that it has to rely on information that is one step removed from 
the direct infliction of torture. Rather than direct observation it depends on 
secondary sources, above all states. As such, monitoring produces evidence 
that is not taken from the “scene of crime,” but rather comes from secondary 
human rights indicators in the shape of claims about policies, institutional 
design, legislation, and statistics. The monitoring process, therefore, involves 
judgments about the risk, expertise, and trustworthiness of NGOs, and 
above all reporting states. At the level of information gathering, there is a 
movement towards a focus on procedures and principles, and at the level 
of assessment there is an implicit assumption that the institutions associated 
with liberal democracies are less likely to produce torture.
1. As to the facts . . .
The result of the Committee’s restricted mandate and limited investigatory 
powers is that the Committee cannot and does not make factual determina-
tions, or even firm allegations. As a result, the Committee members pose 
questions to reporting states that are highly qualified. Rather than making 
direct allegations, members ask states to comment on existing allegations. 
They use phrasing such as: “I have a feeling that . . .,” “there are strong 
allegations that . . .,” or “could you comment on . . .” Often members go 
so far as to admit they know relatively little about the situation in the state 
before them. During the session on Georgia, for example, the rapporteur 
said that he did “not know very much” about the country. In private, most 
Committee members admit that to a certain extent they defer to the state’s 
claims. When disagreements over basic factual issues arise, the Committee 
is in no position to determine who or what is correct. The Peruvian delega-
tion, for example, told the Chair that he was simply wrong to suggest that 
political prisoners might have been convicted by evidence obtained through 
torture, and that he should provide any names and dates to back up these 
allegations. In such conflicts the Committee does not determine who is cor-
rect, but either asks for more information or, more often than not, leaves 
the question open. 
The inability to make factual determinations means that the Committee 
tends to focus on procedures and principles rather than on specific cases. 
The precise questions often vary according to the background of the mem-
bers. The two members who are judges ask questions about the rule of law, 
whereas the two members with NGO backgrounds often ask about gender 
issues and children. In general, the questions either concern broad policies, 
institutional arrangements, or statistical clarifications. One of the Committee 
members, for example, complained to the Georgian delegation that there 
were no statistics on the number of calls to a hotline that was established 
to hear complaints of torture. 
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The polite tone and general nature of the questions makes them relatively 
easy for states to avoid answering. It is also difficult for the Committee and 
observing NGOs to track which questions have been asked and answered. 
Committee members often ask their questions in a way that obscures when 
one question starts and another ends. Sometimes it is unclear if a question 
has been asked at all. When the states reply to the Committee’s questions 
they often choose to group them according to themes. States also say they 
will provide written answers to follow-up questions.39 General questions 
often also invite general answers, whereas specific questions are met with 
a mass of information that the Committee cannot fully digest. In this con-
text, specific substantive issues almost always give way to general issues of 
principle and procedure. 
2. On matters of law . . .
Alongside the uncertainty over factual determinations, the jurisprudence of 
the Committee is notoriously underdeveloped. Although CAT seeks to define 
the general scope of torture to a greater degree than any other international 
human rights instrument, there are few explicit statements by the Committee 
on the nature of treaty obligations. In part this is due to a deliberate case of 
constructive ambiguity. For example, members argue that they do not want to 
create a clear distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment (CIDTP), as this will create a line to which states 
will automatically move towards. By leaving the division between the two 
categories unclear the Committee has more room to operate. NGOs also 
criticize the Committee for constantly shifting its jurisprudence, and argue 
that the Committee makes some claims and drops them later. In general, the 
Committee members move between narrow and broad interpretations of the 
Convention. In particular, there is a tension between the use of a specific 
legal definition of torture that refers directly to the Convention, and a more 
expansive definition based on what might be called ethical sensibilities. In 
recent years, for example, several members have started asking questions 
about domestic violence. Some members welcome this expansion of the 
Committee’s remit and say that although domestic violence may not be strictly 
covered by the Convention, it is important for the Committee not to be too 
legally narrow. Other Committee members, however, believe that domestic 
violence is outside the scope of the Committee’s responsibility because it 
is committed by private actors, not public officials.
 39. There is a formal follow up process through which states are supposed to supply further 
information within a year on specific points asked for by the Committee its concluding 
recommendations.
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An additional jurisprudential weakness is that many of the members’ 
questions are guided by a general sense of what the members call “the press-
ing issues” in a specific country, rather than a narrow interpretation of the 
Convention. The United States, for example, was asked about the response 
to Hurricane Katrina, while Qatar was asked about the treatment of child 
camel jockeys. In response, states reject this expansion of the Committee’s 
scope, either by refusing to answer the question, by answering the question 
while objecting to its scope, or ignoring the question. 
The lack of a precise jurisprudence is partially due to the absence of 
General Comments. The UN treaty monitoring bodies have adopted the 
practice of publishing their interpretation of the content of human rights 
provisions in the form of comments on thematic issues. However, whereas 
the Human Rights Committee had published thirty-one General Comments 
(including two on torture) by 2007, the Committee Against Torture has only 
published two General Comments.40 There are several reasons why the 
Committee has relatively few General Comments. First, other human rights 
committees, which are generally much larger, have created sub-committees 
to draft their comments. The small size of the Committee Against Torture 
makes this more difficult. An additional reason for the few comments is 
the inability of the members to agree amongst themselves. The General 
Comment on Article 2, concerning the responsibilities of states under the 
Convention, for example, was in preparation for six years. Some members 
of the Committee complain that their fellow members are too conservative, 
whereas others argue that their colleagues want to play fast and loose with 
the Convention. 
The jurisprudential uncertainties of the Committee should be understood 
in the context of a dispute as to the status of the final recommendations 
produced by the Committee. This dispute exists both within the Commit-
tee, and between the Committee and several states. The Committee, as 
with all human rights treaty monitoring bodies, does not have the explicit 
power to issue legally binding interpretations of CAT, or even to determine 
whether states are in compliance with the Convention. Given that absence 
of authority, most members are hesitant in their jurisprudential claims and 
frame their arguments in terms of phrasings such as “I wonder if . . .,” “in 
my opinion . . .,” or “it could be said that . . . .” Most Committee members 
recognize that their recommendations are precisely that: recommendations, 
with no binding force. However, many still argue that states have a duty to 
comply. During the US session some of the members were even more force-
 40. OHCHR, Committee Against Torture, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cat/comments.htm. 
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ful, claiming that “it is our interpretation that will decide whether you are 
in conformity, not yours . . . one of the parties has to give way, but it will 
be you, the Committee will have to prevail.” The United States, however, 
explicitly rejected this view, arguing that “the Convention does not grant 
the Committee the power to grant legally binding views.”41 Such rejections 
of the Committee’s power to determine the interpretation of the Convention 
are common and states routinely conclude their presentations with the claim 
that “we are confident that this fulfils our obligations,” implicitly challenging 
the Committee to disagree. 
D. The Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Two weeks after a session closes, the Committee releases its conclusions 
and recommendations. The recommendations are drafted by the Secretariat 
and signed by the Committee members, with the rapporteurs taking the lead. 
Although the recommendations are based on the questions and answers given 
in the session, the Secretariat’s involvement means that the recommendations 
are often more precise than the questions asked by the Committee members. 
The Secretariat members often work on several human rights treaty bodies 
at the same time and have considerable experience. Although the nature of 
the conclusions and recommendations has changed several times over the 
years, they take a specific format. Currently they begin with a set of “posi-
tive aspects” before moving on to “subjects of concern and recommenda-
tions.” Each subject of concern is usually, but not always, matched with a 
recommendation for paths of action. In practice, such recommendations 
are often equivalent to saying that the state “should take all necessary steps 
to combat torture.” 
The language of the recommendations makes it clear that they are not 
obligatory. Most of the recommendations issued by the Committee focus on 
issues of legislative development or policy and are framed in broad terms. 
The Committee recommended that Togo, for example, “take the necessary 
legislative, administrative and judicial steps to prevent all acts of torture and 
ill-treatment.”42 When recommendations are more specific they tend to focus 
on institutional structures. For example, the Committee recommended that 
several states incorporate torture as a particular crime within their criminal 
 41. U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States’ Response to the Questions Asked by the Com-
mittee Against Torture, 8 May 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68562.
htm.
 42. Conclusions and Recommendations: Togo, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th 
Sess., ¶12, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/TGO/CO/1 (2006). See also Conclusions and Recom-
mendations: United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th Sess., 
¶26, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006).
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law.43 The Committee also suggested, for example, that Peru set up a registry 
of complaints against law enforcement officials.44 Very few recommendations 
refer to specific incidents and at most they refer to general allegations. In 
its recommendations to Togo the Committee wrote that the “committee is 
concerned by allegations received . . . of the widespread practice of torture, 
enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and secret detentions.”45 
It is also very rare for the Committee to tell states to that they are in 
direct contravention to the Convention. For the United States, the Com-
mittee recommended that it “should rescind any interrogation technique, 
including methods involving sexual humiliation, ‘waterboarding’, [and] 
‘short shackling.’”46 The language is ambiguous as to whether the United 
States has actually used these techniques and was in direct breach of the 
convention. Of the seven states that were examined during the May 2006 
session, Qatar was the only state that the Committee explicitly told it was in 
breach of the Convention.47 The Committee wrote that “[c]ertain provisions 
of the Criminal Code allow punishments such as flogging and stoning to 
be imposed as criminal sanctions. . . . These practices constitute a breach 
of the obligations imposed by the Convention.”48 
IV. UNIVERSALITY IN A WoRLD of UNEQUAL STATES
The Committee members are very aware of their political and institutional 
weaknesses. As a result a language of “dialogue” predominates during the 
sessions and the tone of the Committee is one of diplomatic politeness. 
Members often thank the reporting state for their “interesting and thorough 
report” and the presence of the “high level delegation.” As the Chair ex-
plained, “We need to go softly. We can not throw everything at them. The 
purpose is not to point fingers but to save lives. . . . We can not demand 
too much as otherwise they will close the door on us.” The Committee 
constantly stresses that states need the political will and capacity to reform. 
 43. See, e.g., Conclusions and Recommendations: Guatemala, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against 
Torture, 36th Sess., ¶10, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GTM/CO/4 (2006); Conclusions and Recom-
mendations: Republic of Korea, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th Sess., ¶4, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/KOR/CO/2 (2006).
 44. Conclusions and Recommendations: Peru, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th 
Sess., ¶14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006).
 45. Conclusions and Recommendations: Togo, supra note 42, at ¶12.
 46. Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of America, supra note 42, at ¶24.
 47. Despite the criticisms of the US contained in the Committee’s Recommendations, at no 
point did it explicitly state that the US was in breach of the Convention. Human Rights 
Watch, U.N. Torture Committee Critical of U.S., 18 May 2006, available at http:// www.
hrw.org/en/news/2006/05/18/un-torture-committee-critical-us.
 48. Conclusions and Recommendations: Qatar, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th 
Sess., ¶12, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/QAT/CO/1 (2006).
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The Committee cannot enforce this, but can only encourage it through a 
careful dialogue. 
The focus on dialogue rather than on the strict application of the Con-
vention inevitably raises the issue of whether all states can and should be 
treated equally. During the sessions, the Committee constantly stresses that 
“no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification 
of torture.” At the same time, however, the Committee recognizes that states 
have vastly different political and institutional capacities. As one member 
put it to me in an interview “we can not expect Uganda to implement things 
in the same way as Norway . . . we must recognize that there are political 
realities on the ground.” Other Committee members criticize this approach, 
arguing that the Committee must treat all states as equals because they “can-
not tell a state they are poor and therefore we will be nice to you.” 
From this perspective, as the custodian of a UN human rights convention, 
the Committee has the responsibility to treat all states equally according to 
universal principles. During the US session in particular, some of the Com-
mittee members and NGOs made informal accusations that the United States 
was given favorable treatment. Others argued that the United States received 
more scrutiny than it deserved. One leading torture NGO privately criticized 
the time spent on the US report, arguing that it detracted from the equally 
grave issues elsewhere in the world. Several members of the Committee 
recognized that the United States was being held to a higher standard, but 
did not see this as a problem because as “the most powerful country in the 
world the US had no excuses” for not implementing the Convention fully. 
Others saw the issue as one of precedent, arguing that where the United 
States leads, others would follow. The issue of different levels of engagement 
cuts both way. For some people, weaker and more unstable states should 
receive more inspection precisely because they are weaker. For other people, 
the very same states cannot be expected to meet the same level of commit-
ment precisely because they are weak and unstable. 
The Committee constantly moves between a recognition of universal 
principles and a recognition that not all states can be treated equally.49 On 
the one hand, the Committee wants to uphold the universal prohibition of 
torture as an absolute right. At another level, the Committee recognizes that 
too narrow of an application of the Convention is counter productive in a 
world where states have different capacities and the Committee can only 
persuade, but not force, states to comply with the Convention. In the course 
of this struggle “developed” states are often subjected to higher standards. 
During his introductory marks to the session hearing the report from the 
 49. Compare MarTTi koSkEnniEMi, froM aPology To UToPia: ThE STricTUrE of inTErnaTional lEgal 
argUMEnT (2005). 
2009 UN Committee Against Torture 795
United States, the Committee chair told the US delegation that “we should 
start by recognizing the unique contribution to human rights of the US 
. . . but like Caesar’s wife this also creates obligations.” Despite the higher 
standards, the Committee also assumes that liberal democracies are, in 
principle, less likely to be in violation of the Convention. This assumption is 
reflected in the amount of the scrutiny that they give these states. Before the 
May 2007 session, which was predominately made up of EU states, many 
of the members openly said that it was going to be a “boring meeting,” as 
there would not be much to discuss. The Secretariat attempted to shorten 
the time dedicated to some states, saying that it was pointless to spend all 
morning on them. 
The preferential treatment plays out in the amount of attention given to 
reporting states. The Committee has discussed whether to make all states 
report after the same amount of time. Although the Convention stipulates 
that states must send a report every four years, there is some flexibility in 
reality because of the extensive delays between a report’s submission and its 
hearing date. At the same time, the Committee gives less attention to states 
perceived as less developed. One member of the Committee offered to ar-
range an interview with me during the Togo session, saying “it is only Togo.” 
The states in the middle ground, those that profess to be liberal democracies 
but do not live up to their promises, attract the most attention. This attention 
is best understood in terms of a broad distinction between principle and 
evidence. States that are perceived as relatively developed are held to higher 
standards, but are also seen to be less likely to commit torture. In contrast, 
states that are perceived as relatively underdeveloped are not expected to 
reach the same standards, but are assumed to be susceptible to violence 
against their citizens and subjects. Hence, the Committee displays different 
levels of evidential trust and perceptions of risk depending on whether it 
considers a state to be developed or underdeveloped.
V. LIbERAL INSTITUTIoNS, dEVELoPMENT, ANd CIVILIzATIoN
In the absence of rigorous jurisprudence and the ability to make factual 
determinations, the Committee relies on assumed universal values and 
institutional formations that are traditionally linked to liberal democracies. 
The grey zone between fact and law is filled with a set of distinctions and 
judgments, used in both the collection of evidence and in its evaluation, 
which reproduces an idealized model of the liberal nation state. In this 
process, the Committee continually distinguishes between developed and 
underdeveloped states. This distinction is based on assumptions about the 
universal direction of development and the desirability of particular legal 
and institutional frameworks as a path to eradicate violence. States that are 
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seen as lacking these frameworks, such as Qatar, Togo, Peru, Guatemala, and 
Georgia, are singled out as being in need of “reform” in order to eradicate 
torture. The Committee told Qatar, for example, that some of its forms of 
punishment were “anachronistic” and had to be abandoned. Other states 
are constantly encouraged to strengthen the reform process. In contrast, 
despite the widespread accusations of torture, the Committee never recom-
mended that the United States reform. Any incidents of torture were treated 
as a historical aberration for the United States. In large measure the precise 
notion of development remains vague, but it serves as a pole around which 
reporting states are conceptually organized by the Committee. From that 
pole the Committee makes judgments made about the risks of torture. The 
relative absence or presence of torture is linked to the relative absence or 
presence of a set of broadly liberal institutions and procedures to which all 
states should be working towards. 
The Committee conceptualizes a state’s development primarily in in-
stitutional terms. Crucially, the processes of the Committee are designed to 
examine compliance with the Convention, rather than to eradicate torture. 
The object of monitoring is one step removed from the infliction of cruelty. 
In this process there is a bias towards specific forms of broadly liberal insti-
tutional arrangements. At one level the questions and recommendations of 
the Committee assume a certain level of institutional capacity. For example, 
they often focus on available statistics as a stable surface against which the 
possibility of torture can be read. The Committee routinely asks delegations 
for statistical break-downs by age and gender of prisoner numbers, police 
killings, torture victims, access to medical care in detention, and sexual 
crimes, amongst other things. While statistical information is relatively 
straightforward for many European or North American states, it is beyond 
many of the states before the Committee. 
At another level the Committee assumes that specific liberal institutions 
are more likely to eradicate torture. Judicial independence, for example, 
is an area of particular concern. The Committee criticized both Japan and 
Qatar for not following universal standards for an independent judiciary.50 
The Committee also has great difficulty understanding the implications of 
the institutional arrangements that differ from the formally liberal frame-
works with which they are most familiar. They had problems, for example, 
in understanding Japanese and Qatari legal systems because they did not fit 
into the common law or civil law models that most of the members worked 
within. The status of shari’a law in Qatar confused several members of the 
Committee and much of the session was spent clarifying technical aspects 
 50. See, e.g., Conclusions and Recommendations: Japan, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against 
Torture, 38th Sess., ¶13, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (2007).
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of the legal system.51 One of the Committee members admitted that he had 
not read the report, but he wanted to know to what extent Islamic law was 
in force in Qatar. In this process, the Committee treated Islamic law itself 
as a problem. 
A state’s development is also often linked to notions of culture. Members 
discuss the fight against torture as “being fundamentally about changing 
mentalities.” The Qatari delegation, for example, was told that “the eradi-
cation of torture began in the minds of . . . officials.”52 The Republic of 
Georgia was asked to “give higher priority to efforts to promote a culture of 
human rights.”53 Other states were told to promote the values and practices 
of democracy.54 The Committee praised Peru for the “change in values” that 
had taken place since the previous regime, but explained that there was a 
further need to “change the culture of the prosecutors.” 
According to one member, many developing countries “may not know 
what to do” and it is therefore helpful to be instructed by the Committee. As 
such, the Committee particularly emphasizes the training of police officers, 
prison guards, soldiers, lawyers, judges, and the general public. According to 
the Committee, training can help prevent torture by raising awareness about 
the Convention. The Committee told the Peruvian delegation that “cultural 
factors are of vital importance, and therefore we need education.” In some 
cases the Committee explicitly linked the continued presence of torture to 
inadequate training. The Committee told Togo, for example, that the “nu-
merous reports containing allegations of acts of torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment submitted to the Committee further demonstrate 
the limited scope of . . . training.”55 Training is seen as necessary for, in the 
words of one Committee member, a “shift in mentalities,” and as such the 
eradication of torture, is seen as an issue of “cultural change.” 
Against this background of liberal values and institutions, the distinction 
between developed and underdeveloped states easily slips into terms of 
civilized and uncivilized states. The presence of torture is linked to absence 
of civilization. One Committee member describes the Committee process as 
being “designed to promote the highest values of civilization and the rule of 
 51. See, e.g, Summary Record of the 707th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 
36th Sess., ¶¶14, 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR/707 (2006). Several years previously, the 
Saudi delegation criticized the Committee for being “unfamiliar with Islamic law.” 
Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 519th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. 
Against Torture, 28th Sess., ¶7, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.519 (2002). 
 52. Summary Record of the 707th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th Sess., 
¶30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR/707 (2006).
 53. Conclusions and Recommendations: Georgia, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th 
Sess., ¶9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GEO/CO/3 (2006).
 54. Summary Record of the 709th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 36th Sess., 
¶4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.709 (2006). 
 55. Conclusions and Recommendations: Togo, supra note 42, at ¶18.
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law.”56 It is not just Committee members that seek to link torture to a notion 
of civilization. Many states, most notably those accused of lacking modern 
values, associate themselves with the values of civilization. Additionally, 
one of the leading anti-torture NGOs argues that “the practice of torture is 
fundamentally at odds with the notion of civilised life.”57 Such connections 
between human rights violations and the absence of “civilization” are com-
mon in the UN human rights system. As Rosemary Foot has argued, the new 
international standard of civilization is partly based around human rights 
principles.58 Similarly, Sally Engle Merry has claimed that the UN human 
rights system operates according to a particular model of a fair society based 
on what she calls “transnational modernity” that resonates with a colonial 
era conception of civilization.59 This model portrays local differences as a 
challenge to a “universal vision of just society.”60 The relative absence or 
presence of human rights as both a value and a practice is linked to the 
relative absence or presence of civilization.
An approach that links torture to the absence of liberal institutions and 
cultures relies on particular sociological assumptions about the relationship 
between institutional forms, values, and the incidence of violence. The 
Committee, which works with its own version of a “liberal peace theory,” 
implicitly assumes that states with liberal institutional structures are more 
likely to comply with the Convention, and that liberal institutions produce 
liberal practices all the way down.61 It is implicitly taken for granted that 
constitutional and legislative reform will lead to changes in practice in prison 
cells and police stations. The absence of torture is linked to the presence of 
self-described liberal institutions and values. 
The implied link between the absence of torture and the presence of 
liberalism not only ignores the ways in which liberal politics can produce its 
own forms of violence, but also reduces violence to an issue of institutional 
design and cultural values, rather than political and economic inequality.62 
That attitude assumes that violence can be eradicated so long as states 
 56. Summary Record of the 662nd Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 34th 
Sess., ¶11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.662 (2005).
 57. Rehab. and ReseaRch ctR. foR toRtuRe Victims, independent monitoRing of human Rights pRactices 
in places of detention (2007) (on file with author).
 58. RosemaRy foot, Rights beyond boRdeRs: the global community and the stRuggle oVeR human 
Rights in china 11 (2000).
 59. Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law - Violence Against Women and the Human 
Rights System, 28 law & soc. inquiRy 941, 943 (2003).
 60. Id. at 946.
 61. On “liberal peace theory,” see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of 
Liberal States, 6 euR. J. int’l l. 503 (1995).
 62. On the violence of liberal democracies, see walteR benJamin, Critique of Violence, in 
Reflections: essays, aphoRisms, autobiogRaphical wRitings 277 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund 
Jephcott trans., 1986). 
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have the correct technical policies, which they strictly follow. Violence that 
remains after this process, such as the death penalty or mass imprisonment, 
remains unquestioned or is even normalized. For example, the Committee 
told the Qatari delegation that its practice of flogging was in contravention to 
the convention.63 The Committee told the United States, on the other hand, 
that it “should carefully review its execution methods, in particular lethal 
injection, in order to prevent severe pain and suffering.”64 
Cruelty, however, is not merely a residue of some pre-modern and un-
civilized past, or an accidental aberration. It can also be an inherent part 
of modern bureaucratic life.65 As Darius Rejali has shown, liberal democra-
cies have been at the forefront of the development of torture techniques. 
Institutions of inspection and accountability that are associated with liberal 
democracy have not eradicated torture. Instead, those institutions have de-
veloped methods of torture that leave no marks and are difficult to monitor.66 
The point here is not the cultural relativist claim that all cultural or political 
formations are equally valid. Rather, the point is that there is a danger of 
treating cruelty as a product of a failed modernity, as the result of a cultural 
void that can only be remedied through the creation of a particular institu-
tional framework. Through the work of the Committee Against Torture, the 
eradication of violence is close to being seen as solely linked to technical 
policy formulations.67 Through a focus on institutions and values a discus-
sion of the causes and consequences of violence is displaced in favor of a 
discussion of the systems that are supposed to monitor violence.
VI. CoNCLUSIoN
Human rights monitoring lies at the heart of the UN human rights system. 
Given that it lacks means of enforcement, the monitoring process is above all 
a practice of knowledge production. However, monitoring is not a transpar-
ent process of information gathering, but can obscure as much as it reveals. 
Monitoring is a second order process, and the monitoring committee relies 
on information gathered by states, NGOs, and other parts of the United 
Nations rather than on direct inspection. It then makes judgments about 
the dangers presented by particular institutional arrangements. Monitoring is 
therefore neither neutral nor technical, but is an inherently political process 
that involves judgments about risk, expertise, and reliability. 
 63. Conclusions and Recommendations: Qatar, supra note 48, at ¶12. 
 64. Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of America, supra note 42, at ¶31.
 65. See hannah aRendt, the oRigins of totalitaRianism (1973).
 66. ReJali, supra note 17.
 67. See also anghie, supra note 15, at 165.
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The Committee Against Torture creates a form of knowledge about cruelty 
and suffering that comes from sources that are always one step removed 
from the infliction of cruelty. In this process debate is shifted away from the 
direct political causes and consequences of violence to the systems that are 
supposed to monitor compliance with human rights. Measurement, monitor-
ing, and prevention become merged. The mechanisms used for measuring 
compliance with the Conventions are in danger of being confused with the 
practices that will prevent torture. On the one hand, the Committee’s limited 
investigatory powers mean that it is not able to determine issues of fact. On 
the other hand, its limited jurisprudence means that it does not determine 
issues of law. In the absence of clear jurisprudence and powers of enforce-
ment, uncertain as to both fact and law, the Committee operates on a grey 
middle ground that focuses on broad institutional arrangements. This focus is 
premised on a particular vision of the state and its institutions that reproduces 
a generalized distinction between developed and underdeveloped nations, 
and at times between civilized and uncivilized nations. The political nature 
of violence is ignored in favor of technical policies and procedures. The result 
is a simultaneous reproduction of political inequalities and a depoliticization 
of the causes and consequences of cruelty and suffering. 
Crucially, these practices of the Committee Against Torture are the result 
of the institutional weaknesses, political marginalization, and contradictory 
demands placed on the Committee, rather than a deliberate strategy or phi-
losophy formed by the Committee. Many of Committee members are well 
aware of the limitations and criticisms of their work, but given their limited 
institutional resources and mandate they have little space to maneuver. 
The enactment of OPCAT in 2006 may alleviate some of these tensions 
because it will introduce direct and regular inspections focused on preven-
tion of torture. At the time of writing, though, it is too early to clearly assess 
OPCAT’s efficacy. Despite its possibilities, the ratification of OPCAT is limited. 
The United States and most of the states of the Middle East, for example, 
are not signatories. OPCAT also considerably overlaps with the European 
based Council for the Prevention of Torture, making it likely that the focus 
of OPCAT activities will be outside Europe and North America. Furthermore, 
the inspection system under OPCAT is still a monitoring system and will still 
produce information that is removed from the direct infliction of cruelty. The 
problems of evidence and evaluation will still remain.
